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A four-stage model (calves, yearlings, adult female and adult male) of the Scandinavian 
moose (Alces alces) is formulated. Fecundity is density dependent while mortality is density 
independent. The paper aims to demonstrate the economic content of such a wildlife model 
and how this content may change under shifting economic and ecological conditions. Two 
different harvesting regimes are explored: hunting for meat, and trophy hunting. It is shown 
how different ways to compose the harvest influences the profitability while, at the same time, 
the population levels of the different stages may only change modestly. It is also shown why 
different market situations require different compositions of the harvest, knowledge that is 
disregarded in the traditional bioeconomic modelling approach. 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is twofold: first, to demonstrate the economic content of a structured 
wildlife population model; and second, to show how this economic content may change under 
different management scenarios. Analysing structured wildlife harvesting models, i.e., models 
where the species are grouped in different classes according to age and sex, has a long 
tradition within biology. Caswell (2001) gives an in-depth overview; see also Getz and Haigh 
(1989). However, economic analysis plays only a minor role in these works. Economic 
reasoning is taken into account in Skonhoft et al. (2002) who analyses various management 
strategies for a mountain ungulate living in a protected area and a hunting area. Four stages 
are included: females and males within and outside the protected area. Because of the 
complexity of this model due to the dispersal mechanism, however, it is difficult to 
understand the various economic mechanisms influencing harvesting and abundance. The 
present paper analyses such economic mechanisms more explicitly where a four-stage model 
(calves, yearlings, adult females and adult males) is formulated. Our analysis has some 
similarities to that of Clark and Tait (1982), who studied the optimal harvest value in a sex-
selective harvesting model where the population was grouped into two stages. See also the 
two-stage seal model in Conrad and Bjørndal (1991). As in Clark and Tait, we basically 
analyse the steady state where natural growth is balanced by harvesting. However, in contrast 
to Clark and Tait, trophy hunting, in addition to meat-value maximization, is studied. We also 
calculate the shadow values of the different population groups, and it is shown how these 
values are different from what are found in the market.  
 
The model is formulated for a moose population (Alces alces) and is studied within a 
Scandinavian ecological and institutional context. The moose is the world’s largest member of 
the deer family and is found in the northern forests of North America, Europe and Russia. It is 
by far the most important game species in Scandinavia, and in Norway and Sweden about 
40,000 and 100,000 animals, respectively, are shot every year. The value of this harvest is 
substantial, and the meat counts for more than 2 per cent of the yearly meat consumption in 
these countries. Moose hunting has traditionally been a local activity, and landowners receive 
the hunting value. The hunters have been the local people; the landowners and their families 
and friends, and the management goal has been to maximize the meat value, possibly 
corrected for forest browsing damage, for stable populations (more details are provided in 
Skonhoft and Olaussen 2005 and the references therein). During the last few years, however, 
a more commercialized hunting and wildlife industry has emerged, and Scandinavian moose   4
hunting is gradually shifting from a ‘family and friend’ activity to a game-hunting market. 
The trophy value of old males plays an important role here. Both the traditional exploitation 
scheme and the new commercialized scheme are studied, and the consequences for harvesting 
and the population composition are analysed. All the time the management problem is studied 
from the landowner’s perspective, meaning that other values related to the moose population, 
like recreation value and intrinsic value, are neglected. Possible damage costs through forest 
browsing are neither taken into account. The meat value harvesting scheme is analysed given 
a fixed meat price while the landowner is assumed to exercise market power under the trophy 
hunting scheme. A ‘quality’ effect, expressed by the male density, is also assumed to 
influence the trophy hunting demand. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the moose population model is 
formulated. Section three demonstrates what happens when the hunting is steered by the 
traditional landowner goal of maximizing meat value. In section four we study the sex and 
age composition under the new exploitation regime of trophy hunting. Section five illustrates 
the models by some numerical simulations, while section six summarizes our findings. 
 
2. Population model 
The Alces alces is a large ungulate with mean slaughter body weight (about 55% of live 
weight) for adult moose in Scandinavia of about 170 kg for males and 150 kg for females. 
The non-harvest mortality rates are generally low due to lack of predators, and there is no 
evidence of density-dependent mortality. On the other hand, fecundity has proven to be 
affected by the female density while the number of males seems to be of negligible 
importance within the range of moose densities in Scandinavia. However, it may play a role if 
the sex composition is very skew (see, e.g., Nilsen et al. 2005 and the references therein for 
more details).  
 
The population at time (year) t is structured in four stages (Lande et al. 2003): calves  , ct X  
( 1 yr < ), yearlings , yt X (12 yr ≤< ),  adult females ( 2 yr ≥ )  , f t X  and adult males ( 2 yr ≥ ) 
, mt X  so that the total population is  ,,,, tc ty tf tm t X XXXX = +++. The population is measured 
in spring before calving. All stages are generally harvested, and the hunting occurs in 
September–October. Natural mortality is assumed to take place during the winter, after the 
hunting season, as the natural mortality throughout summer and fall is small and negligible.   5
The same natural mortality rate is imposed for males and females, and the same sex ratio is 
assumed for the yearlings when they enter the old stages. 
  
Neglecting any stochastic variations in biology and environment, and any dispersal in and out 
of the considered area, the number of calves (recruitment) is first governed 
by ,, ct t f t X rX = with  ,, (,) tf t m t rr X X =  as the fertility rate (number of calves per female). The 
fertility rate generally depends on both female density (number of females) and male density. 
It decreases in the female density  , /' 0 ft f rX r ∂∂ = <, and  may also be reduced when the 
number of males become low,  ' 0 m r ≥ . In addition, we have  , (0, ) 0 mt rX > when  , 0 mt X >  and 
, (, 0 ) 0 ft rX = . Therefore, the recruitment function yields: 
 
(1)  , ,,, (,) ct f t mt f t X rX X X = . 
 
The recruitment function may be a one-peaked value function in the female density, but 
intuitively  ,, , /( ' ) 0 ct f t f f t XX r r X ∂∂= + >  should hold in an optimal harvesting programme, 
at least when females represent meat hunting value only (as here). If not, less female hunting 
coincides with less recruitment which barely can represent an efficient harvest strategy. This 
is confirmed by the numerical simulations (section five)
1.  
 
The number of yearlings follows next as: 
 
(2)  ,1 , , (1 ) yt c ct ct X sh X + =−  
 
where  c s  is the fixed calf natural survival rate (fraction) and , ct h  is the calf harvesting rate. 
Finally, the abundance of (old) females and (old) males become: 
 
(3)  ,1 , , , , 0.5 (1 ) (1 ) f t y yt yt ft ft X sh Xs h X + =− + −  
 
                                                 
1 In the numerical section the recruitment function is specified and parameterized so that  ,, /0 ct f t XX ∂∂ <  
when  , f t X becomes large. However, as indicated, the peak value is not reached in the optimal harvesting 
programmes. At the same time, this means that the recruitment function is strictly concave in the actual region of 
optimization (section five).   6
and  
 
(4)  ,1 , , , , 0.5 (1 ) (1 ) mt y yt yt mt mt X sh Xs h X + =− + − , 
 
respectively, and where the same sex ratio is assumed for the yearlings when they enter the 
old stages.sis the fixed natural survival rate, identical for females and males while  y s is the 
yearling survival rate.  , yt h ,  , f t h  and  , mt h are the harvesting rates of yearlings, females and 
males, respectively.  
 
The population model (1) - (4) has a recursive structure, and when combining (1) and (2) we 
find:  
 
(5)  ,1 , , , , (1 ) ( , ) yt c ct ft mt ft X sh r X X X + =−  
 
Therefore, equations (3) – (5) is a reduced form model in three stages and where all equations 
are first order difference equations. This form is used when studying the different exploitation 
schemes below. The system may, however, be reduced further when omitting the yearling 
population. When combining equations (5) and (3), the female population growth hence reads 
, 1 , , 1 , 1, 1, 1 , , 0.5 (1 ) (1 ) ( , ) (1 ) f ty y t c c t f t m t f t f t f t X sh sh r XXX s h X +− − − − =− − + −  while combining 
equations (5) and (4) yields the male population growth as 
,1 , ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 , , 0.5 (1 ) (1 ) ( , ) (1 ) mt y yt c ct f t mt f t mt mt X sh sh r XXX s h X +− − − − =− − + − . These two equations 
represent a system of two interconnected second order non-linear difference equations, and 
numerical analyses demonstrate that the equilibrium is unique and stable for fixed harvesting 
rates (see e.g., Gandolfo 2001 for a theoretical exposition).  
 
Omitting the time subscript, the female equilibrium (when  0 f X > and 0 m X > ) reads: 
 
(6)  10 . 5( 1 )( 1 ) ( , ) ( 1 ) yy ccf m f sh sh r X Xs h =−− + −  
 
while  
   7
(7) 0.5 (1 ) (1 ) ( , ) (1 ) m yy ccf m f m m X sh sh r X X X s h X =−− + −   
 
represents the male population equilibrium. The female equilibrium condition (6) slopes 
upward in the mf X X − plane for ‘small’ values of  m X , but becomes flat when the number of 
males has a negligible fertility effect. Higher harvesting rates  c h , y h  and  f h shift it down. The 
male equilibrium equation (7) slopes upward as well for ‘small’ values of  f X , but will bend 
backwards if (') f f rrX + becomes negative (cf. footnote 1)
 2. As indicated, it will be an 
unique biological equilibrium for fixed harvesting rates (see Figure 1).   Higher harvesting 
rates c h ,  y h and  m h shift the male equilibrium condition inwards. Therefore, not surprisingly, 
more intensive harvesting of all stages reduces the female as well the male density. On the 
other hand, the yearlings abundance  (1 ) ( , ) yc c f m f X sh r X X X = −  increases under higher 
harvesting pressure if the harvesting activity initially is modest and the intersection of the 
male and female equilibrium conditions takes place on the backward bending part of the male 
equilibrium schedule. The same will be so for the equilibrium calf population, 
(,) cf m f X rX X X = . On the other hand, if the intersection between the male and female 
equilibrium schedules takes place on the upward sloping part of the male schedule, increased 
harvesting activity reduces all stages of the population. 
 
  Figure 1 about here 
 
When combing the above equilibrium equations (6) and (7), the male–female proportion may 
be written as  / [1 (1 )]/[1 (1 )] mf f m X Xs hs h = −− −− . Therefore, the yearling harvest (as well 
as the calf harvest) does not influence the adult population proportion because the natural 
mortality of males and females is equal, and the same fraction of yearlings enters the female 
and male populations. It is also seen that sex-skewed harvesting rates translate directly into 
sex-skewed adult abundance. In an unexploited system, we have  / 1 mf XX = together with 
equation (6) as  (,) ( 1) / 0 . 5 f my c rX X s ss =− .  
 
                                                 
2 The slope of the female population equilibrium (6) is given by  /' / ' f mm f dX dX r r = − while 
/ [1 (1 ) 0.5 (1 ) (1 ) ' ]/[0.5 (1 ) (1 )( ' )] fm m y y c c f m y y c c f f dX dX s h s h s h X r s h s h r r X = − − −−− −− + is 
for the male population equilibrium (7).   8
3. The traditional regime: hunting for meat 
We first study the situation where the landowner maximises the meat value. Because natural 
mortality is assumed to take place after the hunting season (see above), the number of animals 
removed in year t is  ,, , ct ct ct Hh X = ,  ,, , yt yt yt Hh X = ,  ,, , f tf t f t Hh X =  and  ,, , mt mt mt Hh X = . The 
current meat value is accordingly  ,, ,, , , , , () t c ct ct y yt yt f f t f t m mt mt pwh X wh X wh X wh X π = +++  
where  cyfm wwww <<< are the (average) body slaughter weights (kilogram per animal) of 
the four stages and  p (NOK per kilogram) the meat price. As mentioned, the meat hunters 
have traditionally been the landowners and their friends, indicating that a market for meat 
hunting barely exists. Therefore, the unit meat hunting price is assumed to be independent of 
the amount harvested and the stock sizes. When further assuming that the cost of the 
landowner of organizing this hunting is stock independent, the ‘net’ harvest price  p is fixed. 
The meat price will for obvious reasons not affect the optimization except for scaling the 
shadow price values (see below).   
 
When the present-value meat value is to be maximised, and the calf population is replaced 
(see above), the problem is hence to 
 
(7)   
()
,,, , , , ,
,, , , , , , , , , ,,, , , ,
00
max ( , )
yt ft mt ct yt ft mt
t
tt
t c c t ft m t ft y yt yt f ft ft m m t m t XXXh h hh
tt
pw hrX X X w h X wh X wh X ρπ ρ
=∞ ∞
==
=+ + + ∑∑
   
 
subject to the biological constraints (3) - (5).  1/(1 ) ρ δ = + is the discount factor with  0 δ ≥ as 
the (yearly) discount rent. The Lagrangian of this problem may be written as (see, e.g., 
Conrad and Clark 1987) 
() { ,, , , , , , , , ,
0
1, 1 , ,,,
1, 1 ,, ,,
1, 1 ,, ,
(,)
(1 ) ( , )
0.5 (1 ) (1 )
0.5 (1 ) (1 )
t
c ct ft mt ft y yt yt f ft ft m mt mt
t
t yt c c t ft m t ft
t ft y yt yt ft ft
t mt y yt yt mt
Lp w h r X X X w h X w h X w h X
Xs h r X X X
Xs h X s h X










⎡⎤ =+ + + ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ −− − ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ −− − − − ⎣⎦
−− − − −
∑




and where  0 t η ≥ ,0 t λ ≥  and  0 t μ ≥  are the shadow prices of the yearling, female and male 
populations, respectively. No constraints are explicitly formulated for the harvest fractions   9
(but see below). The first-order conditions of this maximizing problem (when  , 0 yt X > , 
, 0 ft X >  and  , 0 mt X > ) are: 
 
(8)        ,1, 1,
,
0.5 (1 ) 0.5 (1 ) 0 y y t t tyy t tyy t
yt
L
pw h s h s h
X
ηρ λ ρ μ ++
∂




(9)       
,, , 1 , , 1 ,
,
(' ) ( 1) (' ) ( 1 )
0,
c c t f ft f ft t c c t f ft t t ft
ft
L
pw hrrX p w h s h rrX s h
X
ρη λ ρλ ++
∂





 (10)      ,, ,1 , , 1 ,
,
'( 1 ) ' ( 1 ) 0 c c t m ft m m t t c c t m ft t t m t
mt
L
pw h r X pw h s h r X s h
X
ρη μ ρμ ++
∂















 ;0 1 c h ≤< , 
 
(12)       11
,









; 0 1 y h ≤ < , 
 
(13)      1
,
























;0 1 m h ≤< . 
 
The second-order conditions are fulfilled due to the concavity of the recruitment function. 
This also secures a unique steady state which is confirmed by the numerical simulations. The 
portfolio equations (8) - (10) steer the shadow price values while conditions (11)–(14) are the 
control conditions where the possibility for keeping each of the stages unexploited at the 
steady state are considered. In this time discrete system with three state variables (and four   10
controls) it is difficult to find the dynamics when originally being outside steady-state. The 
Lagrangian is linear in the four controls, but the so-called Most Rapid Approach Path (MRAP) 
does not generally apply to a system with more than one state variable
3. 
 
As mentioned, the traditional exploitation of the Scandinavian moose has been directed by 
maximizing the meat value for stable populations (again, see Skonhoft and Olaussen 2005). It 
is well known that such an exploitation scheme coincides with the steady-state of the above 
dynamic problem for a zero discount rent,  1 ρ =  (see e.g.,  Clark 1990, Ch. 2). The first order 
conditions of the traditional hunting regime may then be written as: 
 
(8’) ( )0.5 (1 ) yy y y pwh s h η λμ =+ + − ,     
 
(9’)  [ (1 )]( ' ) (1 ) f fc c c c f f f pwh p wh s h r r X s h λ ηλ =++ − + + − , 
 
(10’) ' (1 ) ' (1 ) mm cc m f c m f m pwh p whr X s hr X s h μ ημ =+ + − + − , 
 
(11’) 0 cc pw s η −≤ ; 0 1 c h ≤< , 
 
(12’) ( )0.5 0 yy pw s λ μ −+ ≤ ; 0 1 y h ≤ < , 
 
(13’)  0 f pw s λ −≤ ; 01 f h ≤<  
 
and                                   
 
(14’) 0 m pw s μ −≤ ; 0 1 m h ≤< . 
 
The shadow price equations (8’) - (10’) indicate that the different stages are valued higher 
than their marginal harvest value in the market (see also below). Condition (11’) says that the 
steady state harvest of calves should take place up to the point where the marginal harvest 
benefit is equal to, or below, the cost in terms of reduced yearling population growth 
                                                 
3 Clark 1990, Ch. 10.3 discusses this problem in a two state variables continuous time system. He argues that the 
transitional dynamics generally will not be of the MRAP-strategy, but this strategy will be the ‘practice 
acceptable approach’ in this model.    11
evaluated at its shadow price. When (11’) holds as an inequality, the marginal harvest benefit 
is below its marginal cost and harvesting is thus not profitable,  0 c h = . The interpretation of 
the yearling harvest condition (12’) is similar, but here the costs come through two stages; 
reduced female as well as male growth. When it holds as an inequality, harvesting is again not 
profitable and  0 y h = . The interpretation of the female harvest condition (13’) is simpler. 
Because of the fecundity density effect, meaning that one more female on the margin yields a 
smaller recruitment when the female population is ‘high’ than when ‘low’,  0 f h =  seems less 
likely. The male control condition (14’) is analogous to the female harvest condition. Keeping 
this population unexploited is also considered as a possibility, but is not likely. There are two 
reasons for this; the marginal harvest value is above that of the other stages, and the fecundity 
effect is small and negligible when the population density is high. Therefore, the marginal 
cost for the males will not be above its marginal benefit. On the other hand, the fecundity 
effect is the only reason why it is not beneficial to harvest down the whole male population. 
With ' 0 m r =  and combining conditions (10’) and (14’), it is hence easily revealed that we 
find 1 s = , or zero natural mortality. Conditions (10’) and (14’) are therefore consistent only 
with ' 0 m r > . As  'm r may be small even for a modest male population, the optimal harvest 
rate  m h is suspected to be quite high (see also numerical section). 
 
From condition (14’), when 0 1 m h << , it is seen (as already indicated) that the optimal male 
shadow value exceeds it’s marginal harvest value,  / m pws μ = (NOK per animal). The female 
shadow value exceeds its marginal harvest value as well (conditions 9’ and 13’). Suggested 
that females are hunted (which holds for all realistic parameter values, cf. numerical section), 
condition (13’)  yields / f pws λ = . The female shadow price is hence lower than the male 
shadow price and the difference is directly reflected by the difference in slaughter weight. 
From (11’) it is seen that keeping the calves unexploited demands  c pw η > while keeping 
yearlings unexploited demands () 0 . 5 yy sp w λ μ +> (condition 12’). Therefore, the condition 
for not harvesting the yearlings is directly related to the marginal harvest values of both 
females and males. The shadow price is then  ( )0.5 y s η λμ = + (equation 8’). 
    12
4. Present time: trophy hunting 
The moose-harvesting regime in Scandinavia (like wildlife hunting elsewhere, see e.g., 
Anderson and Hill 1995) is gradually changing, and a hunting and wildlife industry is 
emerging. ‘Present time’ is modelled by introducing a market for trophy hunting of males 
while still having meat-value hunting of the other stages. In a standard manner, the market 
demand is assumed to slope downwards for a higher offtake. In addition to price, the demand 
for trophy-hunting licences may also be contingent upon ‘quality’, expressed by the 
abundance of males
4. When the practice in Scandinavia is followed where one licence allows 
the buyer to kill one animal, which is paid only if the animal is killed, the inverse market 
demand for male hunting licences is written: 
 
(15)  ,, , (, ) tm t m t m t qq h XX =   
 
and where the licence price  t q  (NOK per animal) decreases with a higher harvest, 




Supplying trophy-hunting licences is also costly and depends on the number of licenses sold: 
 
(16)  ,, () tm t m t CC h X =  
 
with fixed cost  (0) 0 C ≥ , and variable cost  '0 C >  and  '' 0 C ≥ . The fixed component includes 
the cost of preparing and marketing the hunting, whereas the variable component includes the 
cost of organizing the permit sale, the costs of guiding and various transportation services. 
With   '' 0 C = and fixed marginal cost, which is assumed in the numerical illustration below, 
the cost structure is just as under the above meat hunting scheme. 
 
The current meat value and trophy hunting profit is now 
,, , , , , , , , , , , , , , [ (,) ] ( ,) ( ) t c ct f t mt f t y yt yt f f t f t mt mt mt mt mt mt mt pwh rX X X wh X wh X qh X X h X Ch X π =+ + + − . 
                                                 
4 See Mattson (1994). In the recreational fishing literature the demand quality effect is explored in many papers 
(see, e.g., Anderson 1983).  
5 It may seem unrealistic that the quality demand effect is based on current period male density and not on, say, 
previous year(s) density. However, this assumption is justified by the fact that the stock usually is monitored 
during the spring and summer, before the hunting starts.    13
The market for trophy hunting is probably something between a competitive market and a 
monopoly. One of these extremes is chosen, and we assume that trophy-hunting licences are 
supplied under monopolistic conditions (the opposite will not change the results 




,, , , , , , ,
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00
,, ,,, ,,
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(, ) ()
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tt
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pwh rX X X wh X wh X









under the biological constraints (3) – (5). The first-order conditions of this problem are (8), 
(9), (11), (12) and (13) together with: 
 
 
(18)    
2
,, , ,,,, ,1 , ,
,
'( ) ( 1 ) ' c ct m f t H mt mt t mt mt x mt mt t c ct m f t
mt
L
pw h rX qh X q h C h q h X s hrX
X
ρη +
∂ ′′ ′ =+ + − + + −
∂
  




(19)    ,, 1
,
0 Hm t m t t t
mt
L
qX h q C s
h
ρμ +
∂ ′′ =+ − − =
∂
; 0 1 m h < <  
 
when we assume that male hunting always takes place at the steady state 
6. 
 
The Lagrangian is no longer linear in all four controls. Therefore, the dynamics will be 
different from the previous regime of meat harvesting only and may possible be more close to 
the saddle-point type characterized by gradually adjustment of the harvesting until harvesting 
equalizes natural growth of all categories of animals (the dynamics is explored in an 
accompanying paper). At the steady state, conditions (18) and (19) may be written as:  
 
                                                 
6 It is here tacitly assumed that male trophy hunting is more profitable than male meat hunting. The condition for 
trophy hunting only may easily be found through the complementary slack conditions when considering male 
meat hunting and trophy hunting as two male hunting alternatives. Not surprisingly, we then find 
,, (' ' ) H mt mt t m qX h qC p w +− >  .   14
(18’)
 




(19’) ' ' 0 Hm m qX h q C s ρμ + −− = ; 0 1 m h < < ,   
 
respectively. The interpretations of these conditions are straightforward (see also above). The 
male harvest benefit is now expressed by a marginal profit term plus a marginal stock effect 
through the demand quality effect. Combining these conditions yield 
(1 )( ' ') ' ' (1 ) ' 0 Hm m X m m c c mf c c mf sq Xh qC s q h X s p w h r X s hr X ρ ρρ ρ η −+ − − − − − =  after 
some small rearrangements. The marginal harvest profit is hence above zero at the optimal 
steady-state, ( ' ') 0 Hm m qX h q C +− >. Not surprisingly, from condition (18’) (as well as from 
19’), this implies a strictly positive male shadow price. Notice that this holds when zero 
discounting ( 1 ρ = ) as well. On the other hand, with hypothetically no male fertility effect 
(' 0 m r = ) and no demand quality effect ( ' 0 X q = ), the male shadow price equals zero.  
 
While the first-order conditions for harvesting calves, yearlings and female are the same as in 
the traditional harvest regime, the new conditions for male harvesting will obviously spill 
over to these stages and the number of hunted animals will generally change for all stages. In 
line with standard harvesting theory (i.e., Clark 1990), we may also find that the male harvest 
increases as the males under trophy hunting are valued higher in the market than in the meat 
hunting regime (cf. footnote 6). However, both the exercise of monopoly power and the 
quality effect will typically work in an opposite manner. Particularly if the quality demand 
effect is strong, the male harvest will decrease and the male population will increase 
compared to the meat hunting regime. As a consequence, the steady-state male–female 
proportion / mf X X  is suspected to increase compared with the traditional regime. How the 
meat hunting is affected is, however, far from clear as either more males may be sustained by 
more yearlings or, at an earlier stage, more females. Moreover, while the meat price p had no 
effect on the optimal harvest policy in the traditional regime, it will now influence the optimal 
harvesting policy of all four stages. Again in line with standard harvesting theory, one may   15
suspect that a larger harvest and fewer animals will be accompanied by a higher price. 
However, the picture is far from clear as there are many conflicting forces at work, not at least 
because of the demand quality effect. The shadow prices will also change between the 
regimes, except that the female value will be the same when female harvest takes place. The 
male shadow price is suspected to increase as the price per animal in the market will increase 
compared to the traditional regime. However, also this intuition may be questioned as the 
market power term in equation (19`), ceteris paribus, reduces the shadow price.    
 
5. Numerical illustration 
Data and specific functional forms 
The steady state of the exploitation schemes will now be illustrated numerically. The 
fecundity rate, decreasing in the number of females, is specified as a sigmoidal function with 
an increasing degree of density dependence at high densities (Nilsen et al. 2005). In addition, 
it shifts out with more males. When the time subscript is omitted the function reads:  
 













with  0 r > %  as the intrinsic growth rate (maximum number of calves per female). The 
maximum number of calves per female shifts down with a smaller male population and where 
0 a > yields the male density effect.  0 K >  is the female stock level for which density-
dependent fertility is equal to density-independent fertility. Thus, for a stock level above K, 
density-dependent factors dominate. The compensation parameter  0 b >  indicates to what 
extent density-independent effects compensate for changes in the stock size. Equation (20) 
implies a recruitment function  (,) / [ 1 (/ ) ] ( 1 )
m aX b
cf m f f f Xr X X Xr X X K e
− == + − %  and is of 
the so-called Shepherd type. With  1 b > , which is assumed, we have the Ricker version 
meaning that  / 0 cf XX ∂∂ < for a large female density. However, as already indicated (footnote 
1), / 0 cf XX ∂∂ > will hold in the optimal programmes and the recruitment function is 
concave
7.   
                                                 
7 Differentiation yields 
2 /[ ( 1 ) ] / ( ]
bb b b
cf X XK b X K X ∂∂= + − + . Moreover, we find 
22 /[ ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ]
bb
cf X Xq b K b X ∂∂ = − ++ − where  0 q > is a positive term. It is easily recognized that 
/0 cf XX ∂∂> implies 
22 /0 cf XX ∂∂ < .    16
 
The trophy demand function is specified linear. In addition, it is assumed that the quality 





mm qe h X
γ αβ =− . 
 
Accordingly, the choke price  0 α >  gives the maximum willingness to pay with a zero quality 
effect,  0 γ = , whereas  0 β >  reflects the market price response in a standard manner. The 
trophy cost function is given linearly as well: 
 
(22)  mm Ccc h X =+  
 
so that  0 c ≥  is the fixed cost and  0 c >  is the constant marginal cost. Table A1 gives the 
baseline parameter values. 
 
Results 
To make a meaningful comparison between the two management schemes, a zero discount 
rent is assumed in all regimes. Table 1 reports the results for the baseline parameter values. 
As a benchmark, a no-hunting scenario is included (first row). Since the yearlings enter the 
(adult) male and female stages at the same sex ratio, the number of males and females are the 
same here. In the traditional regime with meat-value maximization, the female and male 
harvest rates become 0.23 and 0.68, respectively, while there are no harvest of yearlings and 
calves. Therefore, the marginal harvest benefits of these stages are below that of their 
marginal costs in term of losses from reduced harvest of males and females. The number of 
calves and yearlings are higher in the traditional regime than in the unexploited system. As 
explained above (section two) the reason is that the number of females is above the value 
representing the peak value of the recruitment function / ( ' ) 0 cf f dX dX r X r = +< . The male 
shadow value is somewhat higher than that of the female shadow value, and as demonstrated 
in section three, this is due to the meat weight difference only. The yearling shadow value is 
slightly above that of the female value, and follows simply as  () 0 . 5 y s η λμ = +  when  0 y h =  
(see also section three).   17
 
  Table 1 about here 
 
The trophy hunting scheme is first studied when the quality effect is disregarded and the 
inverse demand function (21) reads  mm qh X α β = − . The male harvest fraction shifts 
substantially down and becomes  0.31 m h = . Somewhat surprisingly, the female harvest 
fraction decreases as well. On the other hand, the yearling harvest becomes significant, 
0.5 y h = , while it is still beneficial to keep the calf population unexploited. The demand 
mechanism is of crucial importance to explain this. In order to take advantage of the 
downward sloping demand schedule, the male harvest fraction is reduced to secure a high 
harvest price of males. However, since a reduced harvest rate of males increases the male 
population, ceteris paribus, and thereby reduces the harvest price of males through total male 
harvesting, a change in the composition of female and yearling harvest is required. By 
harvesting more of the yearlings, less male moose are produced compared to a situation with a 
low male harvest rate and no yearling harvest. The reduced female harvest translates into 
yearling harvest in such an amount that the female population is more or less unchanged (Eq. 
3). Hence, by altering the composition of the harvest, the profit increases even if the 
population size at each stage is left almost unchanged. Because of the modest adult population 
changes, the calf population is also more or less the same (Eq. 1). The male and yearling 
shadow values decrease compared to the meat hunting regime and the shadow value of both 
stages are now below their market value. The reduced male shadow value may seem 
surprising since the market price of males have increased, but as discussed above this is 
readily explained by the market power term in Eq. (19`). The yearling shadow value is 
reduced as well because of the lower male shadow value (Eq. 8`). Finally, the trophy hunting 
profit exceeds the traditional regime of meat hunting (which happens per definition, cf. 
footnote 6).  
 
The male harvest rate is further reduced when the quality effect is included. The female 
harvest rate, on the other hand, increases and becomes (by accident) just as in the meat 
hunting regime. Because the yearling harvest again is zero the female population size changes 
just slightly while the male population is substantially higher than without the quality effect. 
With such a high male stock, the demand (through the slope term) is very sensitive to the 
male harvest rate which is just 0.06 in this case. The reason why the yearling harvest rate   18
again is zero is also strictly due to the quality term because by altering the harvest 
composition from young to female a high male population is secured. Thus, this is exact the 
same driving force as described above when altering the female-yearling harvest rate from 
meat hunting to trophy hunting, only now a high male population is desired due to the quality 
effect. The difference between the male and female harvest rate becomes smaller than without 
the quality effect, and the male shadow value is higher than the female shadow value. The 
yearling shadow value increases as well and is now above its value in the market: that is, 
letting this stage grow into adults is more valuable than harvesting just as in the traditional 
meat hunting regime. Table 1 also demonstrates that the trophy hunting price and profit 
further increase when the demand quality effect is added. 
 
Shifting up the meat price p scales up the shadow price values in the traditional regime but 
has no allocation effect. In the trophy hunting regime, the shadow prices increase as well 
except for the male population when the quality effect is present (Table A2, Appendix). The 
reason for this can be found in the quite dramatic harvest rate difference for males and the 
male population falls from about 4,700 to below 900 individuals. The reason is simply that for 
such a price hike, the relative profitability between the male and the other stages are changed. 
Trophy hunting is still profitable and the quality effect still influences the harvest, but not to 
the extreme extent as under the baseline meat price value. In line with intuition, a further 
increase in the meat price will eventually lead to unprofitable trophy hunting and hence meat 
hunting only. The decrease in the male shadow price under the demand quality effect is 
therefore simply explained by the relative profitability increase of meat hunting compared to 
trophy hunting.   
 
The prediction from the standard harvesting model (e.g., Clark 1990) is that more profitable 
harvest leads to a higher exploitation pressure and more harvest. As Table 2 shows, however, 
this result does not unconditionally hold in a stage structured model. More total biomass is 
harvested in the meat hunting regime than in either of the trophy hunting regimes. This is 
readily explained by the market power mechanism already discussed. More interesting, 
however, is the fact that there is more meat hunting (the biomass sum of calves, yearlings and 
females) under trophy hunting than under the meat hunting only scheme. Moreover, the result 
of an increased meat price under trophy hunting in absence of the quality effect is that the 
total biomass harvested decreases (even if slightly). The reason is that reduced male harvest 
dominates increased meat hunting of yearlings and females.    19
 
  Table 2 about here  
 
Sensitivity analyses also demonstrate that the demand parameter α , which yields the 
maximum willingness to pay with a zero quality effect, generally has large allocation effects, 
and a relatively small change means that the male harvest fraction increases both with and 
without the demand quality effect included (Table A3 Appendix). Obviously, this also pulls in 
the direction of more profitable trophy hunting.  The effects of a changed demand quality 
effect γ are also studied (not reported). Not surprisingly, we find that when the quality effect 
is strengthened, it becomes more profitable to keep more male animals.  
 
Finally, we show to what extent the profit is sensitive to changes in the harvest rates. By 
studying how profitability changes when some of the harvest rates are taken as given, the 
importance of making the correct harvest rate choice is highlighted. This new constrained 
optimisation problem is demonstrated for the traditional meat harvest regime with the female 
harvest rate level as exogenously given. The problem now is hence to maximise profit (7) 
subject to the ecological constraint (3) – (5), in addition to  , f tf hh = . As above, we just 
consider steady state with zero discounting and under the baseline parameter values. Figure 2 
illustrates how the profit changes for different values of  f h . As indicated by the figure, it 
turns out that there is a relatively flat area around the (unconstrained) optimal female harvest 
level ( 0.23 f h = , see Table 1). Even when imposing a zero female harvest level, the profit 
does not change dramatically; from 7,154 (Table 1) to about 6,100. The reason is that reduced 
female harvest is compensated by more harvest of yearlings and males. For example, at a zero 
female harvest, the (constrained) optimal yearling harvest rate becomes 0.81 y h =  while the 
male harvest rate is  0.09 m h = . The high yearling harvest rate secures that the recruitment 
stays high while the low male harvest rate is simply a consequence of the massive yearling 
harvest. Hence, there is more to gain by securing high recruitment than by harvesting a higher 
fraction of the male stock.  
 
Figure 2 about here 
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Such compensating mechanism is not to the same extent present when imposing too high 
female harvest. The consequences are more severe for two reasons. First, the optimal yearling 
harvest rate is zero above  0.18 f h = . This means that the possibility of compensating for a 
higher female harvest rate by reducing the yearling harvest rate is absent when the imposed 
female harvest fraction is above its (unconstrained) optimal level. Second, due to the shape of 
the recruitment function, decreased recruitment of a further reduction in the female stock are 
now intensified. This is illustrated by the steep fall in the profit function above 0.30 f h = . 
 
Making similar “mistakes” by optimising given fixed levels of some of the other harvest rates, 
yield the same type of mechanisms. As long as recruitment can be kept up by changing the 
harvest at other stages, the economic consequences are less severe than in the opposite case. 
Furthermore, the same pattern is found in the trophy hunting regimes when imposing similar 
types of restrictions on the optimization problem.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
The paper has analysed a four-stage model of the Scandinavian moose population with 
density-dependent fertility. Two steady state exploitation schemes have been studied and it is 
demonstrated how the changing harvest of different stages is accompanied by significant 
profit changes while, in most cases, leaving the population densities of the different classes 
more or less unchanged. The different ways to compose the harvest, e.g. in yearlings or 
females, and why different market situations require different composition of the harvest, are 
highlighted. Such knowledge is disregarded in the traditional bioeconomic modelling 
approach. Moreover, we have demonstrated that shadow prices may change counter 
intuitively, and why this may happen.  
 
The numerical section illustrates the predictions from the theoretical model. In the traditional 
meat hunting only harvest scheme, we find that zero calf and yearling harvest and modest 
female harvest are accompanied by a high male harvest rate. Within this regime, the 
biological notion of females as ‘valuable’ and males as ‘non-valuable’ is easily recognized, 
even if the shadow value of the males may be higher than that of the females. The male stage 
is more intensively harvested since its influence on recruitment is small, even for small and 
modest stock levels. The emerging exploitation scheme with a market for trophy hunting 
changes the optimal harvest decision of males, and hunting down a large fraction of the male   21
population will no longer represent and optimal policy. In addition, the trophy-hunting market 
allocation spills over to the conditions for meat-value maximization of young and females. 
The male–female population ratio increases and contingent upon the trophy hunting market, 
both more and less female harvest may take place. 
 
The present model encompasses some general results that will survive in more complex stage-
structured models. Most importantly, we have highlighted the economic forces influencing 
harvest in four different stages that, in various degrees, are present in many structured 
population models. Our model has four stages that recruit in different ways. The calf 
represents a value through recruitment to the yearling stage in the same way as the yearling 
represents a value through recruitment to the (adult) male and female stages. As long as 
density-dependent growth factors are weak, or non-existent (as here), harvesting calves, or 
yearlings, does not pay off in a meat maximising harvest regime. The fact that the optimal 
harvest policy under trophy hunting may involve harvest of the yearling stage is surprising 
and reflects an important insight: The composition of the harvest in the meat harvesting stages 
may involve seemingly sub-optimal strategies because they are driven by the male trophy 
hunting activity. For the females, on the other hand, a traditional trade-off between 
recruitment and harvest is present through the density-dependent fertility mechanism. This 
mechanism will also be present in more complex models. Finally, the (adult) male stage is 
considered as the biological ‘end’ product as its influence on recruitment is substantial only 
for small densities. However, irrespective of this; our model demonstrates that the male 
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Figure 1: Biological equilibrium male and female population stages.  





m X  
Male equilibrium condition (7) 




































Figure 2: Profit meat hunting regime when estriction female harvest rate.  
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Table 1: Steady state different management regimes (no discounting,  1 ρ = ).Baseline parameter 
values.  hc, harvest fraction calf, hy  harvest fraction young, hf  harvest fraction female, hm harvest 
fraction male, Xc, number of  calves (in 1,000 animals), Xy number of young (in 1,000 animals), Xf  
number of females (in 1,000 animals),Xm number of males (in 1,000 animals), η young shadow price 
(in NOK 1,000/animal), λ female shadow price (in NOK 1,000/animal), μ male shadow price (in NOK 
1,000/animal), q trophy price male (in NOK 1,000/male), and  π profit (in NOK 1,000).  
 
(--indicates not calculated)
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Table 2: Steady state different management regimes (no discounting,  1 ρ = ). Baseline parameter 
values. H total harvest (in 1,000 animals), wH  biomass harvested (in 1,000 kg). Different meat prices; 
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Table A1: Baseline biological and economic parameter values 
 
    








r %  max. specific growth rate  1.15  Nilsen et al. (2005) 
K  female stock level where density 
dependent factors dominates 
density independent factors 
         2 000 animal  Nilsen et al. (2005) 
a  male density recruitment factor  0.007   
b  density compensation parameter  2  Nilsen et al. (2005) 
wc  Average weight calve  65 kg  SSB (2004) 
wy  average weight young  135 kg  SSB (2004) 
wf  average weight females  150 kg  SSB (2004) 
wm  average weight male  170 kg  SSB (2004) 
sc  survival rate calves   0.90  Nilsen et al. (2005) 
sy  natural mortality young  0.95  Nilsen et al. (2005) 
s   natural mortality female and male  0.95  Nilsen et al. (2005) 
p  meat price  50 NOK/kg  Storaas et al. (2001) 
α  choke price  30,000 NOK/kg  Calibrated 
γ  quality parameter demand  0.000043  Calibrated 
β  slope parameter demand  50 NOK/animal
2 Calibrated 
c   fixed harvest cost  500,000 NOK  Calibrated 
c  marginal harvest cost  2,000 NOK/animal  Calibrated 
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Table A2: Sensitivity, increased meat price, p=60. Steady state different management regimes (no 
discounting,  1 ρ = ).  hc, harvest fraction calf, hy  harvest fraction young, hf  harvest fraction female, hm 
harvest fraction male, Xc, number of  calves (in 1,000 animals), Xy number of young (in 1,000 
animals), Xf  number of females (in 1000 animals),Xm number of males (in 1,000 animals), η young 
shadow price (in NOK 1,000/animal), λ female shadow price (in NOK 1000/animal), μ male shadow 
price (in NOK 1000/animal), q trophy price male (in NOK 1,000/male), and  π profit (in NOK 1,000). 
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Table A3: Sensitivity, increased choke price, α=35,000. Steady state different management regimes 
(no discounting,  1 ρ = ).  hc, harvest fraction calf, hy  harvest fraction young, hf  harvest fraction 
female, hm harvest fraction male, Xc, number of  calves (in 1,000 animals), Xy number of young (in 
1,000 animals), Xf  number of females (in 1,000 animals),Xm number of males (in 1,000 animals), η 
young shadow price (in NOK 1,000/animal), λ female shadow price (in NOK 1,000/animal), μ male 
shadow price (in NOK 1,000/animal), q trophy price male (in NOK 1,000/male), and  π profit (in NOK 
1,000). 
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hc 
 
hy
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hm 
 
Xc 
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η 
 
λ 
 
μ 
 
q 
 
π 
 
Trophy 
hunting.  
No quality 
effect 
 
 
0 
 
 
0.40 
 
 
0.12 
 
 
0.38 
 
 
1.14 
 
 
1.02 
 
 
1.80 
 
 
0.72 
 
 
6.76 
 
 
7.90 
 
 
6.33 
 
 
21.51 
 
 
9,108 
 
Trophy 
hunting. 
With quality 
effect 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0.23 
 
 
0.07 
 
 
1.15 
 
 
1.03 
 
 
1.85 
 
 
4.16 
 
 
8.92 
 
 
7.90 
 
 
10.87 
 
 
27.09 
 
 
10,050 
 
 